INDIAN LIMITATION ACT. ACT No XV of 1877

PART I. PRELIMINARY. PART II. Limitation of Suits, Appeals and Applications. 　Sect. 7. Legal disability Double and successive disabilities. Disability of representative. If a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application be, at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, a minor, or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time prescribed therefor in the third column of the second schedule hereto annexed. When he is, at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or when, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period, after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so prescribed. When his disability continues up to his death, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so prescribed. When such representative is at the date of the death affected by any such disability, the rules contained in the first two paragraphs of this section shall apply. Nothing in this section applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period within which any suit must be instituted or application made. 　Sect. 9. Continuous running of time. When once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it: Provided that where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the time prescribed for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues. PART III. Computation of Period of Limitation. 　Sect. 12. Exclusion of day on which right to sue accrues. Exclusion if certain periods in the case of appeals and certain applications. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal, or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal as a pauper, and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, or order appealed against or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded. Where a decree is appealed against or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for application to set aside an award, the time requisite obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. 　Sect. 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction, and of time occupied in certain other proceedings. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action, and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit, proceedings in which have been stayed by order under the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 20, the interval between the institution of the suit and the date of staying proceedings, and the time requisite for going the Court in which proceedings are stayed, to the in which the suit is re-instituted, shall be excluded. In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time during which the applicant has been making another application for the same relief shall be excluded, where the last-mentioned application is made in good faith to a Court which from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature is unable to grant it. Explanation 1 - In excluding the time during which a former suit or application was pending or being made, the day on which that suit or application was instituted or made, and the day on which the proceedings therein ended, shall both be counted. Explanation 2 - A plaintiff resisting an appeal presented on the ground of want of jurisdiction shall be deemed to be prosecuting a suit within the meaning of this section. 　Sect. 17. Effect of death before right to sue accrues. When a person who would, if he were living, have a right to institute a suit or make an application, dies before the right accrues, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of instituting or making such suit or application. When a person against whom, if he were living, a right to institute a suit or make an application would have accrued dies before the right accrues, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased against whom the plaintiff may institute or make such suit or application. Nothing in the former part of this section applies suits to enforce rights of pre-emption or to suits for possession of immoveable property or of an office. 　Sect. 19. Effect of acknowledgment in writing. If, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit or application, in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has bean made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a new period of limitation, according to the nature of the original liability shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. When the writing containing the acknowledgment is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed ; but oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation 1.— For the purposes of this section an acknowledgment may be sufficient, though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance, or enjoyment has not yet come, or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform, or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to a set-off, or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the property or right. Explanation 2.— In this section "signed" means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf. 　Sect. 20. Effect of payment of interest; of part payment of principal; of receipt of produce of mortgaged land. When interest on a debt or legacy is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid as such by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy, or by his agent duly authorized in this behalf: Or when part of the principal of a debt is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid by the debtor or by his agent duly authorized in this behalf: A new period of limitation, according to the nature of the original liability, shall be computed from the time when payment was made: Provided that, in the case of part-payment of the principal of a debt, the fact of the payment appears in the handwriting of the person making the same. Where mortgaged land is in the possession of the mortgagee, the receipt of the produce of such land shall be deemed to be a payment for the purpose of this section. PART IV. Acquisition of Ownership by Possession. 　Sect. 26. Acquisition of right to easements. Where the access and use of light or air to and for any building have been peaceably enjoyed therewith, as an easement, and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, and where any way or water-course, or the use of any water, or any other easement (whether affirmative or negative) has been peace-ably and openly enjoyed by any person claiming title thereto as an easement and as of right, without interruption, and for twenty years, the right to such access and use of light or air, way, water-course, use of water, or other easement, shall be absolute and indefeasible. Each of the said periods of twenty years shall be taken to be a period ending within two years next before the institution of the suit wherein the claim to which such period relates is contested. Explanation.— Nothing is an interruption within the meaning of this section, unless where there is an actual discontinuance of the possession or enjoyment by reason of an obstruction by the act of some person other than the claimant, and unless such obstruction is submitted to or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant has notice thereof and of the person making or authorizing the same to be made. 　Sect. 28. Extinguishment of right to properly. At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property his right to such property, shall be extinguished. THE SECOND SCHEDULE First Division: Suits. Part I. Thirty days. 　Art. 1. Part II. Ninety days. 　Art. 2. Part III. Six months. 　Art. 3. 　Art. 4. Under Act No. IX of 1860 (to provide for the speedy determination of certain disputes between workmen engaged in railway and other public works and their employers), section one; six months from the date when the wages, hire, or price of work claimed accrue or accrues due. 　Art. 5. Part IV. One year. 　Art. 6. 　Art. 7. For the wages of a household servant, artisan, or labourer not provided for by this schedule, No. 4; one year from the date when the wages accrue due. 　Art. 8. For the price of food or drink sold by the keeper of a hotel, tavern, or lodging-house; one year from the time when the food or drink is delivered. 　Art. 9. For the price of lodging; one year from the time when the price becomes payable. 　Art. 10. 　Art. 11. 　Art. 12. 　Art. 13. 　Art. 14. 　Art. 15. 　Art. 16. 　Art. 17. 　Art. 18. 　Art. 19. 　Art. 20. 　Art. 21. 　Art. 22. 　Art. 23. 　Art. 24. 　Art. 25. 　Art. 26. 　Art. 27. 　Art. 28. 　Art. 29. Part V. Two years. 　Art. 30. 　Art. 31. 　Art. 32. 　Art. 33. 　Art. 34. 　Art. 35. 　Art. 36. Part VI. Three years. 　Art. 37. 　Art. 38. 　Art. 39. 　Art. 40. 　Art. 41. 　Art. 42. 　Art. 43. 　Art. 44. 　Art. 45. 　Art. 46. 　Art. 47. 　Art. 48. 　Art. 49. 　Art. 50. For the hire of animals, vehicles, boats or household furniture; three years from the date when the hire becomes payable. 　Art. 51. 　Art. 52. 　Art. 53. 　Art. 54. 　Art. 55. 　Art. 56. For the price of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant at his request, where no time has been fixed for payment; three years from the date when the work is done. 　Art. 57. 　Art. 58. 　Art. 59. 　Art. 60. 　Art. 61. 　Art. 62. 　Art. 63. For money payable for interest upon money due from the defendant to the plaintiff; three years from the date when the interest becomes due. 　Art. 64. 　Art. 65. 　Art. 66. 　Art. 67. 　Art. 68. 　Art. 69. 　Art. 70. 　Art. 71. 　Art. 72. 　Art. 73. 　Art. 74. On a promissory note or bond payable by instalments; three years from the expiration of the first term of payment, as to the part then payable; and for the other parts the expiration of the respective terms of payment. 　Art. 75. On a promissory note or bond payable by instalments, which provides that, if default be made in payment of one instalment, the whole shall be due; three years from the time when the first default is made, unless where the payee or obligee waives the benefit of the provision, and then when fresh default is made in respect of which there is no such waiver. 　Art. 76. 　Art. 77. 　Art. 78. 　Art. 79. 　Art. 80. 　Art. 81. 　Art. 82. 　Art. 83. 　Art. 84. By an attorney or vakil for his costs of a suit or a particular business, there being no express agreement as to the time when such costs are to be paid; three years from the date of the termination of the suit or business, or (where the attorney or vakil properly discontinues the suit or business) the date of such discontinuance. 　Art. 85. 　Art. 86. 　Art. 87. 　Art. 88. 　Art. 89. 　Art. 90. 　Art. 91. 　Art. 92. 　Art. 93. 　Art. 94. 　Art. 95. 　Art. 96. 　Art. 97. 　Art. 98. 　Art. 99. 　Art. 100. 　Art. 101. For a seaman's wages; three years from the end of the voyage during which the wages arc earned. 　Art. 102. For wages not otherwise expressly provided for this schedule; three years from the date when the wages accrue due. 　Art. 103. 　Art. 104. 　Art. 105. 　Art. 106. 　Art. 107. 　Art. 108. 　Art. 109. 　Art. 110. For arrears of rent; three years from the date when the arrears become due. 　Art. 111. 　Art. 112. 　Art. 113. 　Art. 114. For the recission of a contract; three years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the contract rescinded first become known to him. 　Art. 115. 　Art. 116. 　Art. 117. 　Art. 118. 　Art. 119. 　Art. 120. Suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule; six years from the time when the right to sue accrues. 　Art. 121. 　Art. 122. 　Art. 123. 　Art. 124. 　Art. 125. 　Art. 126. 　Art. 127. 　Art. 128. By a Hindu for arrears of maintenance; twelve years from the date when the arrears are payable. 　Art. 129. 　Art. 130. 　Art. 131. 　Art. 132. 　Art. 133. 　Art. 134. 　Art. 135. 　Art. 136. 　Art. 137. 　Art. 138. 　Art. 139. 　Art. 140. 　Art. 141. 　Art. 142. 　Art. 143. 　Art. 144. Part IX. Thirty years. 　Art. 145. 　Art. 146. Part X. Sixty years. 　Art. 147. 　Art. 148. 　Art. 149. Second Division: APPEALS. 　Art. 150. 　Art. 151. 　Art. 152. 　Art. 153. 　Art. 154. 　Art. 155. 　Art. 156. 　Art. 157. Third Division: APPLICATIONS. 　Art. 158. 　Art. 159. 　Art. 160. 　Art. 161. 　Art. 162. 　Art. 163. 　Art. 164. 　Art. 165. 　Art. 166. 　Art. 167. 　Art. 168. 　Art. 169. 　Art. 170. 　Art. 171. 　Art. 172. 　Art. 173. 　Art. 174. 　Art. 175. 　Art. 176. 　Art. 177. 　Art. 178. 　Art. 179. 　Art. 180.